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"In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice, in
practice there is..
-Yogi

Berra

I. THE THREAT OF CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR
TERRORISM
In a precursor to the congressionally mandated annual State
Department reports, Patterns of Global Terrorism,' the CIA wrote a
prescient study in 1976 that concluded that globalization was an
irreversible trend likely to aggravate the problem of terrorism in the
. Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, currently assigned
to
International Negotiations Division, Joint Staff in the Pentagon. LL.M. (2005) and

S.J.D. Candidate, University of Virginia School of Law. The views presented are
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff or the Department of Defense.
1. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 2656f (West 2006) (requiring the Secretary of State to
provide annual country reports on terrorism).

AM. U. INT' L. REv.

[22:361

coming years.' Modem terrorism emerged from an eclectic mix of
right-wing, state-sponsored and third world liberation fronts in the
1960s and 1970s; by the 1990s, it had developed into a method of
irregular war waged by a global Islamic jihad.3 The attacks of
September 11 signaled that terrorism had reached strategic maturity,
a radical undermining of the Westphalian order, ushering in a
potentially new epoch of warfare fought not by states, but within
states.4 The concern in the Middle Ages was not with bellum, or the
public use of force, but rather with duellum, the private use of force.
Before the Westphalian era, states focused on regulating the private
use of force, establishing sovereignty and the government's
monopoly on the use of force. The focus on limiting the initiation of
war by one state against another state, orjus ad bellum, is a creature
of the Westphalian paradigm. In the contemporary era, state
monopoly on the exercise of catastrophic military power has been
challenged. After 9/11 there is renewed interest in the state's
reassertion of its monopoly on military power and a focus on limiting
the private use of force by individuals.
Al Qaeda has accelerated the trend by disassociating the conduct
of warfare from securing political goals, making untenable any sort
of negotiation or peace based on realist or idealist principles of
statecraft, such as balance of power or compromise. For al Qaeda,
strategy is sacrificed to the objective of annihilation. It is not
hyperbole to suggest that 9/11 was a failure of strategic nuclear
deterrence: if al Qaeda had had a nuclear weapon on that date, it
would have used it.
As students of politics, we are conditioned to reject the possibility
of the use of nuclear weapons to achieve political aims. The purpose
of the jihad, however, is to terrorize the enemies of God, not to reach
2. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISM: DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS 29-30 (Apr. 1976) (setting forth the
following four trends of globalization that exacerbate terrorism: (1) clashes
between conflicting ethnicities; (2) instability in urban settings; (3) increasing
development of terrorist means and capacities; and, (4) increasing susceptibilities
of societies).
3. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 197 (1991).
4. See id. at 192 (warning that "[a]s the second millennium A.D. is coming to
an end, the state's attempt to monopolize violence in its own hands is faltering ....
The rise of low-intensity conflict may, unless it can be quickly contained, end up
destroying the state.").
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a political objective. 5 Just as the study of war has shifted from
superpower competition to insurgent warfare and terrorism, our
understanding of terrorism itself may be evolving. Some argue that,
historically, terrorists sought to achieve an audience over which to
exercise terrorist influence, but the new extreme terrorist appears to
have only one audience in mind-a deity-and the goal is
apocalyptic, not political. 6 This focus is difficult for the modem,
Western mind to grasp, since organized violence-war-is generally
regarded as "the continuation of policy by other means." 7 Cultural
norms surrounding violence can vary greatly, even within the same
race and country'-based merely on regional experiences-so it
should not be surprising that a cultural chasm separates these
terrorists from a conventional understanding of the purposes of war.
"Clausewitz," the Prussian military strategist, "has been reversed
by bin Laden. Violence is not an instrument of policy; violence is the
purpose of politics. Bin Laden has done nothing less than create a
new form of achievement, and therefore, a new kind of warfare." 9
Moreover, the nation-state is no longer considered the subject or
primary actor of international politics, as is the case with traditional
warfare. ° Instead, the goal is to foment an inter-civilization "blood
feud" between the Islamic and Western worlds. Not reducible to
political compromise that might terminate the conflict, "the [blood]
feud knows no beginning and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour
associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as
the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal."" For those

5. See DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE AGE OF SACRED TERROR 17
(2002) (paraphrasing sheikh leader Omar Abdel Rahman's comments that jihad is
not a matter of prayer or discussion, but rather bullets and bombs).
6. See Martha Crenshaw, The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the
21st Century, 21 POL. PSYCHOL. 405, 411 (2000) (contrasting "new" terrorists
from "old" as motivated by and answerable only to a god).
7. See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret
eds. & trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832).
8. See Dov Cohen & Joe Vandello, Meanings of Violence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
567, 573-74 (1998) (providing different understandings of violence between
southern and northern culture in the United States as an example of varying
interpretations of violence between cultures).
9. David A. Westbrook, Bin Laden's War, 11-12 (Buffalo Legal Stud. Res.
Paper Series, Paper No. 2006-015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-927934.
10. See id. at 2 (noting that violence typical comes from "non-state actors").
11. EMRYS L. PETERS, THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA: STUDIES IN PERSONAL
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engaged in a blood feud, there is no "modem" world to seek or to
build. 12
After the Twin Towers fell, the prolific writer and Canadian
politician Michael Ignatieff concluded, "[e]vil has escaped the prison
house of deterrence.

' 13

"The logic of deterrence that once kept state

violence in some kind of check has no traction with loners and the
cult leaders of global terrorism."14 September 11 remains an
inspiration, inviting ever more creative and spectacular methods of
attack, much as the assassination of Tsar Alexander II inspired
nihilists to launch an age of anti-bourgeois terrorism throughout
Europe.15
This vision--collapsing states and cadres of undeterrables
equipped with weapons of mass destruction-might seem a
lurid exaggeration, and if so dangerous .

. .

. It could be

argued that the attack of September 11, terrible as it was, is
unlikely to recur, since security has been tightened and Al
Qaeda's recent attacks have all been on secondary rather than
primary targets. September 11 might turn out to represent the
worst that will ever happen, rather than the16first stage of an
escalating series of apocalyptic spectaculars.
It is difficult to offer a prediction on which of Ignatieff's futures
will come to pass. One thing is certain, however. The specter of
nuclear weapons being placed in the hands of terrorists could lead to
repeated terrorist nuclear strikes, a haunting fulfillment of van
Creveld's prediction of the end of the nation-state.17 This possibility
converts terrorism from a second or third order nuisance to a
strategic, even existential, threat. 8
AND CORPORATE POWER 67

12. See

(Jack Goody & Emanuel Marx, eds., 1990).

ROBERT D. KAPLAN, WARRIOR POLITICS: WHY LEADERSHIP DEMANDS

A PAGAN ETHOS

3-4 (2002) (contrasting modem populist movements from those

of the twentieth century).
13.

MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF

TERROR 152 (2004).

14. Id. at 151.

15. See id. at 152.
16. Id. at 152.
17. See id. at 147-48 (describing the declining effect of the nation-state's role
in war as terrorist networks are able to afford and access materials to produce
nuclear weapons).
18. See BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 5, at 220, 229 (analyzing the increased
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Unfortunately, atomic bomb design and manufacture is not
extremely difficult; the primary hurdle for developing a bomb is
obtaining sufficient fissile material. 9 Construction of a nuclear bomb
is a relatively simple affair, and it is possible to do so in a very short
amount of time. 20 Three decades ago, the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) concluded:
[A] small group of people, none of whom have ever had
access to the classified literature, could possibly design and
build a crude nuclear explosive device. They would not
necessarily require a great deal of technological equipment or
have to undertake any experiments. Only modest machineshop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing
suspicion would be required. The financial resources for
acquisition of necessary equipment on2 open markets need not
exceed a fraction of a million dollars. '
At the time of the dire assessment, the likelihood of nuclear
terrorism was deemed to be fairly low. 22 Thirty years after the study,
there is ample reason for greater worry as well as some room for a
degree of comfort. Today, the number ofjihadists is growing in both
number and geographic dispersion, and they continue to seek a
nuclear capability to use against "soft" targets in the West, such as
cities.23 To fund these extremists, an infusion of wealth from Saudi
priority of terrorist organizations in U.S. foreign policy as those groups obtain and
use nuclear weapons).
19. See Steve Goldstein, Experts: Program to Secure Enriched Uranium
'Slow,' PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 7, 2004, at A05 (summarizing expert opinions of
the accessibility of nuclear bombs once fissile material is obtained).

20.

Cf. OFFICE OF SECURITY AFFAIRS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF ENERGY, MANUAL FOR

ch. 1, §
3(a)(1) (July 15, 1994) (averring that DOE internal security regulations, targeted at
keeping terrorists completely out of nuclear sites-rather than trying to catch them
as they leave-out of fear that terrorists will have "an unauthorized opportunity...
PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARD AND SECURITY INTERESTS

to use available nuclear materials for onsite assembly of an improvised nuclear
device" supports the premise that nuclear weapons can be developed quickly and
easily).

21.

OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, 95TH CONG., NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

NTIS ORDER No. PB-275843, at 140 (June 1977).
22. See Jeffrey H. Epstein, The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism, FUTURIST, May
1998, at 10 (citing former RAND researcher and terrorism expert Brian Jenkins,
who argued in 1975 that the likelihood of nuclear terrorism was quite low, but that
the risk was increasing).
23. See Press Release, Director of Nat'l Intelligence, Nat'l Intelligence
AND SAFEGUARDS,
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Arabia, Iran, and other countries, is flowing into terrorist groups.24
Anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is increasing, and the

radicalization process is occurring more anonymously through the
use of the Internet, raising the prospect of attacks by unknown and
isolated groups. Indications that Islamic terrorists seek to acquire
and use nuclear weapons are at least unsettling; as those reports

increase in veracity, the prospect becomes terrifying. Osama bin
Laden, for example, has already stated an interest in acquiring
nuclear weapons.2 6 Another al Qaeda spokesman, Sulaiman Abu
Ghaith, suggested the group has a right to kill up to four million
Americans in retaliation for deaths it claims Israel inflicted on
Muslims.2 7 Besides al Qaeda, other Islamic extremists have

expressed an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. In 2002,
Chechen rebels threatened a nuclear strike against Moscow in
revenge for Russia's scorched earth operations in Chechnya.28 The
commitment to acquire nuclear weapons reflects what a RAND

Estimate, Declassified Key Judgments of the Nat'l Intelligence Estimate, Trends in
Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States (Apr. 2006), available at
[hereinafter
National
http://www.dni.gov/press-releases/pressreleases.htm
Intelligence Estimate] (accounting for the rise in the jihad movement and
describing the Iraq conflict as "the 'cause celebre' for jihadists, breeding a deep
resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for
the global jihadist movement").
24. See John Mintz, Wahhabi Strain of Islam Faulted-Saudis' Funding Helps
Foster Terror Groups, Experts Say, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at Al 1
(describing a congressional hearing tracing terrorist funding to Saudi wealth).
25. See National Intelligence Estimate, supra note 23.
26. See I-wei J. Chang, Nuclear Terrorism Realities; Report Urges Security,
Ending Production to Prevent Atomic 9/11, WASH. TIMES, June 28, 2004, at A13
(discussing attempts by terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons, most likely from other
countries).
27. See Suleiman Abu Gheith, Why We Fight America, reprinted in Middle
East Media Research Inst., 'Why We Fight America': A1-Qa'ida Spokesman
Explains September 11 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million Americans with
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Dispatch Series No. 388 (June 12, 2002)
al
(presenting
http://memri.org/bin/opener.cgi?Page=archives&ID=SP38802
Qaeda's ideological, historical, and religious grounds for seeking retaliation
against the United States).
28. See Peter Baker, Russians Announce Chechnya Crackdown-Rebels Shoot
Down Helicopter, Killing 9, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2002, at A 12 (citing a Chechen
website calling for stronger rebel tactics that would result in the use of nuclear
weapons).
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Corporation study called the "inexorable escalation" of terrorist goals
29
over the last decade.

On the other hand, however, we have taken effective steps to
reduce our vulnerabilities, particularly after September 11. Since that
day, for example, the United States has captured or killed a majority
of al Qaeda leaders, reformed the national intelligence apparatus,
established a weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") division in the
FBI and removed significant policy and bureaucratic barriers to
information-sharing throughout the U.S. government.3" In
international diplomacy, the United States and other countries have
worked to develop and strengthen a host of multilateral
arrangements, including the Proliferation Security Initiative, U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts
of Nuclear Terrorism, amending the U.N. Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Atomic
Energy Agency ("IAEA") Nuclear Safety Program and the IAEA
Committee on Safeguards and Verification, and most recently, the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.31 These programs
and others are designed to provide a multi-layered "defense in depth"
against nuclear terrorism.32
29. See BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, COUNTERING AL QAEDA: AN APPRECIATION
OF THE SITUATION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR STRATEGY 14 (2002) (describing the

potential of terrorist groups to graduate to more sophisticated weapons such as
weapons of mass destruction).
30. See John D. Negroponte, Editorial, Yes, We Are Better Prepared,WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2006, at B07.
31. See Weapons of Mass Destruction:Reviving Disarmament:Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int'l Relations of the H. Gov't

Reform Comm., 109th Cong. 6-8 (2006) (statement of William Tobey, Deputy
Adm'r for Def. Nuclear Nonproliferation, Nat'l Nuclear Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep't
of Energy) (noting that the combined efforts of the United States and other
countries resulted in a legal mandate and international framework for effectively
preventing proliferation).
32. See id. at 7 (defining "defense-in-depth" as the combination of political will
and actual capacity to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, which includes the
Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program and the Global Threat
Reduction Initiatives); see also Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: The
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (July 15, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060715-3.html
(listing
cooperative efforts such as plans to improve physical control, security, and
accountability of nuclear weapons; detection and suppression of illicit trafficking
of materials; mitigating consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism; cooperating in

368
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The most worrisome nuclear threat is the specter of a blind side
terrorist attack-an attack against a major city that cannot be
attributed to any state or terrorist group.33 No nation or group would
accept responsibility, leaving few ready options for response. This
scenario is in many ways worse than the "bolt out of the blue" first
34
strike scenarios that worried strategic thinkers during the Cold War.
In the case of a Soviet attack, the Soviet Union was subject to
immediate retaliation, and therefore, deterrence.35 In the case of a
blind side terrorist attack, there is no ready attribution, thus
deterrence is weaker.

II. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM
The United States has responded to the threat of attack by
weapons of mass destruction with three mutually supporting
pillars--counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence
management. 36 Nonproliferation seeks to prevent states and non-

the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensuring that
states take all possible measures to deny a safe-haven to terrorists; and
strengthening the U.S. legal framework).
33. See Andrew Corr, Nuclear Terror and the Blind-Side Attack: Deterrence
through Nuclear Tagging I (Mar. 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript available at
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-corr/NuclearTerrorAndTheBlindSideAttack
DeterrenceThroughNuclearTagging.pdf) (defining "blind side terrorist attack" as a
"stealth nuclear attack on a nation's economy for which no terrorist or state entity
acknowledges responsibility").
34. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., MODERNIZING U.S. STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE FORCES: THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES xv-

xvi (May 1983) (describing "bolt out of the blue" as an attack with no prior
warning).
35. See id. at xvi-xvii; cf Nikolai Sokov, Monterrey Inst. of Int'l Studies, The
Agenda for Arms Control Negotiations After the Moscow Treaty, 1-2 (PONARS
at
278)
(Oct.
2002),
available
Policy
Memo
No.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm-0278.pdf (underscoring the notion that a
country need not possess the capability of completely destroying an opposing
party's weapons arsenal for deterrence to work, as the effectiveness of deterrence
turns on the perceptions of the parties involved).
36. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION 2 (Dec. 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY DEC. 2002]
(noting that pursuit of intelligence collection and analysis, delivery systems,
research and development, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and targeted
strategies against hostile states and territories, streamline the three pillars of the
U.S. national security strategy).
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state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.3 7
Diplomacy, multilateral agreements, arms control, threat reduction
assistance, and export controls are all elements of nonproliferation,
and each is designed to dissuade or impede the spread of WMD.38
Consequence management includes preparations to respond more
effectively to the use of WMD in order to reduce and ameliorate the
effects of an attack.3 9 These efforts enhance deterrence by denying an
adversary the objectives of the attack-to terrorize a civilian
population and economy, to sow doubt, cause confusion and loss of
national resolve, and to destroy a way of life.
Counterproliferation is comprised of active defenses to disable,
interdict or disrupt, or destroy WMD, as well as a strong declaratory
policy and capability to deter attack. 0 Effective deterrence is
grounded in forming the subjective belief in the mind of the
adversary that we have the capability to inflict harm and possess the
willpower to exercise that capability. Evident capability means
possessing a nuclear or conventional force structure that is able to act
to prevent a nuclear attack, or to respond effectively if an attack is
not avoided. Whatever their composition, forces must exercise
sufficient power to impose an unacceptable cost on an opponent who
is considering a WMD attack. During the Cold War, this capability
generally meant existence of a second-strike capability. Willpower
means that an adversary must be convinced that we actually would
use the forces at hand, whether nuclear or conventional, in response
to an attack.
Each pillar of the National Strategy is essential in dealing with
terrorism, but if we focus more closely on the deterrence aspect of
37. Id. at 2, 3-5.
38. Id. at 3-5.
39. See id. at 5 (elaborating that the strategy of consequence management
applies to both internal attacks and to the use of WMD against forces deployed
abroad).
40. See id. at 2-3 (characterizing counterproliferation as an operational strategy
that seeks to offset the threat of possession and increased use of WMD by hostile
states and terrorists who threaten U.S. national security). Counterproliferation
involves an active strategy of bolstering intelligence and law enforcement
capabilities to detect and prevent the delivery of WMD to hostile states and
terrorists, reinforcing the U.S. government's willingness to use blunt military force
to deter WMD use, and enhancing the ability of U.S. military forces and
appropriate civilian agencies to destroy WMD systems before they can be
deployed. Id.
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counterproliferation, some complications become more apparent.
The Cold War deterrence model, resting on a "balance of terror" with
complementary superpower capability, may have less relevance in
the age of terrorism.
Counterproliferation strategies often carry additional risk because
of the possibility of error, political effect, miscalculation, or
unintended consequences inherent in the threat or use of force. The
United States and other countries appear to have sampled the range
of counterproliferation strategies in an effort to deter WVMD
terrorism. These efforts have included strategies of coercive
diplomacy and the use of force, as well as proclaiming the right to
employ preemptive force in some cases. The National Security
Strategy of 2002, for example, declared,
For centuries, international law recognized that nations
need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action
to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent
danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often
conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of
an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue
states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using
conventional means. They know such attacks would fail.
Instead, they rely on acts of terror, and potentially, the use of
weapons of mass destruction-weapons that can be easily
concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning. 41
Four years later, the National Security Strategy was reissued,
reaffirming the approach and providing additional context of the
doctrine as a realistic component of self-defense, stating,
If necessary . . . under long-standing principles of selfdefense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks
occur .... When the consequences of an attack with WMD
are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly
41. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (June 2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

JUNE 2002].
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by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and
logic of preemption.42
The special problems associated with some counterproliferation
approaches are that they may fail to identify and apply pressure to
the locus of incentive that motivates terrorist attacks, so they may not
be an effective deterrent. If a commercial ship carrying WMD is
interdicted on the high seas, for example, it is possible-even
likely-that the flag state under which the vessel is registered, or the
commercial shipping company that owns the vessel, not is
knowledgeable of the WMD on board the vessel. The flag state and
the shipper likely are victims, so taking action only against the vessel
might have little utility in deterring a state or non-state group that is
illicitly smuggling the cargo.
Moreover, the very nature of the apocalyptic terrorist threat means
that traditional military action may achieve a tactically successful
interdiction, but it in no way diminishes the threat or the likelihood
of continuing attempts to smuggle and employ WMD.
The reason is that military action or the threat of conventional
military force cannot win the intensely ideological struggle of
religiously-inspired terrorism. "Within the logic of global jihad,
every action that tends to threaten the ummah strengthens the logic
and increases the allure of terrorism."43 Operational successes by the
United States sow the seeds of escalating resistance. "Specifically,
the more successful the United States is perceived to be, the more
fighting the United States seems to constitute a sufficient politics.""
Because of the pronouncements in the National Security Strategy
and the war in Iraq that led to the toppling of Saddam Hussein, some
scholars suggest we are entering a new age of preventive war, an era
in which there is growing acceptance of preventive uses of force.45 I

42. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 23 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

2006].
43. See Westbrook, supra note 9, at 15.
44. Id.

MAR.

45. See Thomas M. Nichols, Anarchy and Order in the New Age of Prevention,

22 WORLD POL'Y J. 1, 1-3 (2005) (suggesting that "mass-scale suicide terrorism,"
proliferation of WMD, and the "loosening of rogue states from Cold War
constraints" induces temptation for preventative measures).
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doubt that assessment. Preemption comes with a high political cost,
and preventive action may not purchase the intended security.
Consider Iran, for example. Fareed Zakaria comments that a
preemptive strike against Tehran's nuclear facilities likely would do
limited physical damage while serving as a rallying point for the
Iranian population in support of the mullahs.46 Similarly, former
national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski offers an even more
dire assessment that "an attack on Iran would be an act of political
folly, setting in motion a progressive upheaval in world affairs. With
America increasingly the object of widespread hostility, the era of
American preponderance could come to a premature end."'47
The war in Iraq has displayed its own set of challenges, making it
more difficult to evaluate the efficacy of preemption. With Iraq, it is
open to determination whether the war generated deterrent effects
against potential rogue states, such as Libya, helping to bring them
into the world community, or whether the arrow points the other
way, with the cost of the war so high that it is the United States that
is deterred from new intervention. The benefits of liberating Iraq
from a brutal dictator and redrawing the political calculus in the
Middle East in favor of democracy are balanced by the difficulties in
suppressing an intransigent insurgency.48 On the other hand, the logic
of preventive action might be clearer when it is more successful and
the costs of inaction greater. The Israeli attack against Baghdad's
Osirak reactor complex in 1981, for example, probably prevented
Saddam Hussein from constructing a nuclear device before the first
Gulf War.49
46. See Fareed Zakaria, Tag-Teaming the Mullahs, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 2004,
at 37 (contending that U.S. preventative measures cannot succeed in Iran, and that
Europe must employ coercion or engagement tactics to prevent Iran from going
nuclear).
47. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Op-Ed., Been There, Done That, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
23, 2006, at 2, (alluding to the fact that while the United States remains the clear
world superpower, "it has neither the power nor domestic inclination to impose
and then to sustain its will in the face of protracted and costly resistance").
48. See generally THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY
ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 321-362 (2006) (chronicling difficulties faced by the United
States in Iraq in pacification and reconstruction, including outside insurgents
entering the fight, difficulty in obtaining the support of the local population in
some regions, difficulty in training the Iraqi army, maintaining a united coalition,
and increasingly creative and effective insurgent tactics).
49. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 765 (2004) (noting
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III. ANOTHER LOOK AT DETERRENCE
Given
the
complexities
inherent
in
conventional
counterproliferation strategies, there is some value in rethinking
models of deterrence in the world after 9/11. New threats require
new methods of deterrence. 0 The traditional theory of deterrence,
and its application, has atrophied since the demise of the Soviet
nuclear threat.
The idea that deterrence is dead has moved beyond the academy to
become fairly accepted political orthodoxy." At the same time,
international law scholars generally have walked away from the idea
of deterrence, which is predicated on the threat of retaliation, as
52
prohibited by Article 2, Paragraphs 3 and 4, of the U.N. Charter.
These views are important because they drive not only how we look
at deterrence (and what we signal to our adversaries), but also how
we address other issues such as preemptive war and missile defense.
One important caveat is that motivation of retaliation must be
calibrated based on deterrence of future acts rather than punishment
for previous acts. If deterrence does not work or cannot work, then
we are more likely to find preemptive war and missile defense
attractive responses to catastrophic terrorist attack.
Conventional wisdom suggests traditional concepts of deterrence
were shattered as a consequence of 9/11. Speaking at the Military
Academy at West Point commencement in 2002, President Bush
said,

that Israel's destruction of the Osirak reactor likely assisted in the expulsion of Iraq
from Kuwait by the United States in 1991).
50. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY MAR. 2006, supra note 42, at 1, 3-38
(responding to new threats to national security by "leading an international effort

to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy").
51. See Keith B. Payne & C. Dale Walton, Deterrence in the Post-Cold War
World, in STRATEGY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 161, 179 (John Baylis et al.
eds., 2002) ("For the United States and its allies, nuclear deterrence may soon
prove difficult or impossible to maintain.").
52. U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 3-4; see Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving
Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (1972) (contending that while
the words "reprisals" and "retaliation" do not appear in the Charter, the drafters
sought to prohibit the use of force as a means of punishment and limit force to
permissible self-defense).
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For much of the last century, America's defenses relied on
the cold war doctrines of deterrence and containment. In
some cases, those strategies still apply, but new threats also
require new thinking. Deterrence-the promise of massive
retaliation against nations-means nothing against shadowy
terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. 3
President Bush returned to West Point in 2006, declaring,
The enemies we face today are different in many ways from
the enemy we faced in the cold war. In the cold war, we
deterred Soviet aggression through a policy of mutually
assured destruction. Unlike the Soviet Union, the terrorist
enemies we face today hide in caves and shadows and emerge
to attack free nations from within. The terrorists have no
borders to protect or capital to defend. They cannot be
deterred-but they will be defeated. 4
Negative incentives are constructed by rebuilding strategic
deterrence in a way that exploits the adversary's fear, doubt or
indecision and holds at risk those things held most dear. 5 In fact,
despite their ethereal motivations, evidence suggests that terrorist
groups and their rogue state sponsors can be deterred; deterrence
against such foes may be more robust than is often believed. After
Israel unleashed a pulverizing attack against Lebanon in response to
Hezbollah kidnapping and murdering Israeli soldiers, Sheik Hassan
Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, said in an interview,
We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would
lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me,
if I had known on July 11 ... that the operation would lead
to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not, for
humanitarian, moral, social, security, military and political

53. See Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in
West Point, New York, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 944, 946 (June 1, 2002).
54. See Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in
West Point, New York, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1037, 1039 (May 27,
2006).
55. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY JUNE 2002, supra note 41, at 14
(suggesting that limiting the potential damage from a WMD would deter their use
by persuading potential terrorists that their desired ends are unattainable).
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reasons. Neither I, Hezbollah, prisoners in5 6Israeli jails, nor
the families of the prisoners would accept it.
If Nasrallah is to be believed, the entire war in Lebanon could
have been averted through more effective deterrence signaling,
saving thousands of lives. Such deterrent signals are developed
against the backdrop of experience and history, with each side
conditioning the other and each side creating the context in which
deterrence is exercised. In the case of Iraq, in advance of the
coalition invasion, the White House warned Saddam Hussein that his
country would face "annihilation" if he responded by launching
weapons of mass destruction. 7
Conventional deterrence still has utility as well. The Government
of Pakistan was apparently deterred from resisting the U.S. effort to
remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and carry the war
across the border into Pakistan to seek Taliban and al Qaeda forces.
Pakistani President Musharraf recalls that Deputy Secretary of State
Armitage warned that the United States would bomb Pakistan "back
into the Stone Age," if Musharraf did not cooperate. 8 "This was a
shockingly barefaced threat," Musharraf recalls, "but it was obvious
the United States had decided to hit back, and hit back hard . . . I
war-gamed the United States as an adversary ... [I]f we do not join
them, can we confront them and withstand the onslaught? The
answer was no, we could not .... 19
Deterrence has long been a staple in the study of state-centered
warfare. By "influencing the behavior of potential wrongdoers
56. See Matthew Schofield & Leila Fadel, Nasrallah Comes Close to Admitting
That Kidnappings were a Mistake, MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 27, 2006, at A13; see
also Rory McCarthy, Hizbullah Leader: We Regret the Two Kidnappings That Led
to War with Israel, GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2006, at 1; Yaakov Katz, Security and
Defense: MarchingBackward?, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 3, 2006, at 1-3.
57. See Joyce Howard Price, U.S. Reprisal to be 'Annihilation',WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2002, at 1 (justifying the policy of deterrence as necessary to prevent the

U.S. from becoming a target).
58. Cf Interview by Melissa Block with Richard Armitage, Deputy Sec. of
State 2001, Armitage Denies Making 'Stone Age' Threat (Sept. 22, 2006),
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6126088
available
(relaying that Armitage denies threatening Pakistan with military force, but noting
that Armitage did inform Pakistani intelligence officials that they had to decide if
they were "with us or against us").
59. See PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, IN THE LINE OF FIRE: A MEMOIR 201 (2006).
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through the prospect of punishment, ' 6° deterrence avoids some, but
not all, of the pitfalls and backlash inherent in policies based on
conventional threats, bullying, intimidation and preemptive attack.61
Those more aggressive approaches often play into the hands of
authoritarian leaders who "know that if they provoke the United
States, Washington will isolate their countries and thus strengthen
62
their authority.
Historically, deterrence theory has focused on two areas of
analysis-strategic nuclear deterrence 63 and case studies of
conventional or regional deterrence, such as the Korean War and the
Falklands War.64 During the Cold War, the United States adhered to
a doctrine of nuclear deterrence as the cornerstone of strategic
stability. 65 The present age of terrorism, however, has placed
deterrence in a less certain position. Although promising
Armageddon and actually greater destruction than other
counterproliferation approaches, deterrence may be less threatening
to many countries because the chance of attack is more remote and
they can exercise a greater degree of control over the process.

60. See LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, DETERRENCE 8 (2004) (tracing
development and use of the concept of deterrence as a behavioral influence).
61. See, e.g.,

the

Fareed Zakaria, What Iranians Least Expect; What ifBush

Publicly Offered to Open an Embassy in Tehran?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 2006, at 35
(suggesting that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is winning the public
diplomacy race, as the United States has tended to use hard tactics such as threats
and intimidation).
62. Ian Bremmer, The World is J-Curved, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at B3
(suggesting that the United States respond to such provocation by encouraging free
trade and open communication within and without authoritarian states, which will
eventually undermine their authoritarian governments).
63. See generally STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE (1998); ROBERT JERVIS ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY & DETERRENCE (1985);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
64. See generally STEPHEN J. CIMBALA, MILITARY PERSUASION: DETERRENCE
AND PROVOCATION IN CRISIS AND WAR (1994); PAUL K. HUTH, EXTENDED

(1988); KENNETH WATMAN ET AL.,
U.S. REGIONAL DETERRENCE STRATEGIES (1995); Ed Rhodes, Review of Empirical
Studies of Conventional Deterrence(Ctr. for Global Sec. and Democracy, Working
Paper, July 1999), http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/rhe0l/.
65. See ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 26-32 (1974) (outlining the
DETERRENCE AND THE PREVENTION OF WAR

shifting doctrines of nuclear deterrence that progressed during the nuclear arms

race between the United States and the former Soviet Union).
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Deterrence is a subjective concept, exposing to risk something that
the other side values. For example, in 2001 Deputy Israeli Police
Minister Gideon Esra suggested that Israel might bury Palestinian
suicide bombers with pig skin or pig blood.66 Strict Muslim tradition
holds that if a Muslim is contaminated by a pig before death, he
would be denied martyr status and entry into heaven. In February,
2004, Rabbi Eliezer Moshe Fisher of the Jerusalem Rabbinical Court
ruled, "there is no Halachic ban on using bags of lard in buses and
other places," including schools, shopping malls and restaurants, to
save lives by deterring Muslim terrorist bombers.67 Similarly,
Russian forces in Chechnya reportedly buried Islamic terrorists in
pig skin as a deterrent to others. 68 During the Spanish-American War,
some suggest General John Pershing executed Islamic insurgents
with bullets dipped in pig fat, and then wrapped their bodies in
pigskin before burial.69
The United States policy for combating weapons of mass
destruction warns, "[t]he United States will continue to make clear
that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming forceincluding through resort to all our options-to the use of WMD
against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies." 70
Beyond that, however, there is nothing publicly available regarding
when an attack crosses the threshold that warrants employment of
"all options."
One perspective is that deterrence is strengthened through
ambiguity-if adversaries are uncertain as to what might incite
punishing retaliatory response, they will tend to avoid approaching
the edge of risky behavior.7" It seems equally plausible, however, that
66. Burial Plan to Deter Suicide Bombs, CNN, Aug. 21, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/08/20/suicide.bombers.
67. Ellis Shuman, Rabbis OK IsraeliPlan to use Pig Lard to Ward Off Suicide
2004,
Feb.
12,
INSIDER,
ISRAELI
Bombers,

http://web.israelinsider.com/Articles/Security/3304.htm.
68. Arutz

Sheva,

Chechen

Terrorists to

be

Buried

in

Pigskin,

2002,
31,
Oct.
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/print.php3?what=news&id=32749.
69. Steven Menashi, Teaching Evil, POLICY REVIEW, Apr.-May 2002, at 90, 90
(reviewing KAPLAN, supra note 12, and describing General Pershing's tactics,
which effectively deterred guerrilla violence by Muslim terrorists in the
Philippines).
70. NATIONAL STRATEGY DEC. 2002, supra note 36 at 3.
71. See, e.g., GEORGE & SMOKE, supra note 65, at 562-63 (discussing then
ISRAELNATIONALNEWS.COM,
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reluctance to delineate at least some sort of framework for retaliation
could be interpreted as a sign of indecision, a lack of resolve and
unity, and even weakness. Delineating particular circumstances that
would elicit retaliatory response, however, permits terrorists to "play
chicken," testing the resolve of the United States and potentially
goading the country into a response. A middle course may be to
discuss openly theoretical models of deterrence in the post-9/l1
world-giving some indication of the thought process surrounding
nuclear retaliation, but avoiding red-line statements that would
commit policymakers in advance.

IV. ATTRIBUTION
In addition to capability and will, the new strategic deterrence
against catastrophic terrorist attack requires introduction of a third
component: attribution. During the bipolar era, attribution of a
nuclear strike was quite easy, as only the Soviet Union (and later
China) was capable of launching a devastating nuclear attack. The
diffuse nature of the contemporary threat of nuclear terrorist attack
makes attribution of a nuclear terrorist attack potentially incredibly
difficult, and yet the National Security Strategy indicates effective
deterrence requires rapid attribution.72 The analysis that follows
seeks to broaden our understanding of how attribution may be
achieved, as well as how deterrence might be approached in the
absence of positive attribution.
It may be possible to deter non-state actors; deterring their rogue
state sponsors is a much more certain prospect, since they have the
accoutrements of statehood that can be placed at risk-government,
population, economy, territory, military forces, to name just a few.
Attributing a terrorist attack to a state-sponsor shifts the analysis
away from the non-state actor and toward a nation-state. This
converts an attack by a non-state insurgency into an interstate
conflict-recovering the rules and stability of expectations that are
the hallmark of the Westphalian system and a cornerstone of
deterrence.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' mid-1950s deterrence policy, which was
intentionally vague for strategic purposes).
72. NATIONAL STRATEGY DEC. 2002, supra note 36, at 3.
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Terrorists have only their lives to lose, and they likely do not hold
them dear, so merely putting their lives at risk, or threatening to
bring them to trial, often is no deterrence at all. The problem of statesponsored terrorism is linked to the problem of warfare generally,
since state-sponsored terrorism is a form of secret war, sponsored,
funded, and abetted by states. In order to deter the state sponsor, we
have to design an incentive system that internalizes the costs of
proliferation to the regime providing nuclear material to terrorists.
Strategic nuclear deterrence may be able to accomplish this shift in
costs, but requires us to overcome what is referred to in torts as the
enigma of cause-how can we demonstrate a connection between the
nuclear attack and the state sponsoring the attack? If the costs of
responding are sufficiently high, we can deter state action if we can
positively attribute the acts of terrorists to specific states. During the
Cold War, attribution was easy since attack by intercontinental
ballistic missiles ("ICBMs") or long-range bomber aircraft could be
detected in advance and positively attributed to the attacking state.
Even if a retaliatory response could not be launched before a
successful attack, a second strike capability was ensured through
dispersion of nuclear force assets throughout a triad consisting of
manned bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and ICBMs.73
Defining the parameters of state responsibility in the post-9/ 11
world "is the last significant area of the great effort to codify
international law."74 Historically, states have avoided liability for
hostile acts committed against another state by associated private
persons or non-state actors who were not acting as agents of the
state." In 2001, the International Law Commission ("ILC") adopted

73. See Stephen J. Cimbala, Triage of Triads: Does the United States Really
Need Three Strategic-Retaliatory Forces?, in DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 119, 121 (Stephen J. Cimbala ed.,

2001).
74. See David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The
Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 857,
859 (2002) (discussing the International Law Commission's mandate to "codify
and progressively develop international law").
75. David D. Caron, The Basis of Responsibility: Attribution and Other TransSubstantive Rules, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS
CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY

Lillich & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds., 1998).

109, 126-27 (Richard B.
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articles on state responsibility, but their effect remains in question.76
The ILC efforts to achieve authoritative codification reached
maturation just as the number of states, new and more influential
groupings,
and
organizations,
regional
international
nongovernmental organizations is expanding.77 In accommodating
the transformed nature of world politics, the articles attribute to a
state conduct committed by private persons or non-state actors who
are "empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the
governmental authority... provided the person or entity is acting in
that capacity in the particular instance."78 The difficulty, of course, is
to determine when a terrorist-a leader like Nasarallah in Lebanonis actually working on behalf of a foreign government-such as the
government of Iran.79
Once attribution is established-a connection between the terrorist
activity and a state-holding the state responsible or liable is
fundamental to rebuilding deterrence. Positive attribution
conclusively links terrorist activity to a state sponsor, and thereby is
the shortest route toward opening the possibility of effective
response. Positive attribution strengthens deterrence, but the nature
of terrorist attack is such that the origin and sponsors of the attack
may be difficult or impossible to ascertain. Fresh approaches are
needed to overcome the difficulties inherent in attribution of terrorist
attack and science can help to regain some ability to attribute an
attack positively.
Fallout forensics and nuclear materials tagging are perhaps the
most promising methods that might be used to attribute a WMD
terrorist attack positively, thereby offering the best opportunity to

76. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res.
56/83, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter ILC State
Responsibility].
77. Caron, supra note 74, at 859 (expressing the likelihood that the "increasing

complexity in international actors" will influence state responsibility more than the
ILC's codification efforts).
78. ILC State Responsibility, supra note 76, art. 5.

79. For a discussion on Osama bin Laden's status as the agent of a state, see
John Quigley, InternationalLaw Violations by the United States in the Middle East
as a FactorBehind Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REv. 815, 826 (2002)

(explaining that the United States has "assert[ed] the identity of bin Laden's group
and the Taliban government of Afghanistan").
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link the attack to a state sponsor.80 Tagging nuclear material
throughout the regular fuel cycle process also would make it easier
for states and the IAEA to determine the origin of material later
diverted to create a nuclear weapon, making post-attack forensics
that much easier. 8'
Fallout analysis, an obscure branch of nuclear forensic science, is
poised to permit researchers to attribute a nuclear detonation to a
specific country, and perhaps a specific reactor. 82 If future research
confirms the feasibility of such attribution, it will dramatically
strengthen strategic nuclear deterrence against nuclear terrorist
attack. The goal of fallout analysis is to discover quickly the source
of nuclear material that went into construction of a particular bomb.83
The United States restarted the Cold War-era fallout analysis
program in 1999 in order to help to rebuild deterrence against
nuclear terrorism. 84 If terrorists, as well as their state sponsors, know
that a bomb can be traced back to them, they are less likely to use
one, even if they posses it. Although this assumption may be
questioned, accurately identifying the source reactor of the highly
enriched uranium certainly complicates proliferation and planning
for states of proliferation concern, as well as attack planning for nonstate groups inclined to employ a nuclear weapon. Much of the
radiochemistry work from the Cold War has had to be resurrected;
retired scientists were recalled and decades of old analysis was
dusted off. The program now involves manned aircraft and ground

80. See Michael A. Levi, Deterring Nuclear Terrorism, ISSUES
TECH.,

IN SCI. AND

Spring 2004, available at http://www.issues.org/issues/20.3/levi.html.

81. Id.
82. Fissile material, such as plutonium and uranium "come in various isotopes,
and a given sample of either metal will combine several of those isotopes in hardto-alter combinations. To some degree, one can infer those characteristics from the

design details of the enemy's production facilities and from the operating histories
of its plants." Id.
83. William J. Broad, Addressing the Unthinkable, U.S. Revives Study of
Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2004, at Al (asserting that quick attribution "would
clarify the options for striking back," helping to facilitate deterrence in the first
place).
84. Id. (outlining the revival of the program when in 1999, Dr. Jay C. Jarvis, a
nuclear scientist and "then head of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at the
Pentagon, began an effort to address the identification problem by financing
research at the nation's weapons laboratories").
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robots that can enter nuclear fallout environments in order to take
critical measures of radiochemistry signatures and profiles.85
Nuclear tagging is a related method that also could strengthen
deterrence. Tags are unique physical parameters associated with
fissile material. "Each fissionable piece yields a unique postexplosion signature. 86 This is "analogous to stamping each
manufactured bullet with an indelible serial number and maintaining
ammunition registration documents. 87 If the nuclear material were
used in a nuclear terrorist attack, the reactor or laboratory of origin
could be determined, exposing the mediating state to responsibility.
Fallout analysis builds deterrence and tagging does so even more.
The prospect of being wrongly held accountable for providing
material to nuclear terrorists provides incentive for peaceful
countries to participate in a comprehensive tagging program. As
more countries tag their materials, the potential pool of untagged
highly enriched uranium will shrink, dramatically increasing the
effectiveness of post-attack forensics.
Expanding the network of cooperation among states, scientists and
laboratories enhances deterrence. Tagging and fallout forensics are
mutually supportive and cooperation in tagging could lead to more
assertive efforts to gain cooperation from nuclear states in tagging
and registering their fissile material. 88 Establishing doctrine in the
absence of (or complementary to) effective forensic and tagging
programs, however, is necessary in order to maintain a complete
deterrent umbrella.

V. LEVERAGING MODELS FROM TORTS
So far the effort against international terrorism has drawn from
two overlapping and complementary conceptual legal models:
criminal law and international law, the latter represented by the law
of armed conflict or international humanitarian law. Much of the
debate over the rights of detained terrorist suspects, for example, has
85. COMM. ON SCI. AND TECH. FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAKING THE NATION SAFER: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 325 (2002).
86. Corr, supra note 33, at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 7-8.
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turned on which model should be applied. Both of the two bodies of
law are essential to combating terrorism, and efforts to suggest that
one particular model is inherently better creates a false choice. But
there is a third area of law-the civil law of torts-almost entirely
absent from the conversation.
Concepts in civil law may be particularly useful in designing
effective responses to terrorism, including further development of
civil litigation against terrorism.8 9 The application of tort theory to
strategic nuclear doctrine offers value in rebuilding deterrence
against catastrophic nuclear terrorism.
If the United States were to be suddenly struck by a nuclear
weapon, Iran would be an immediate suspect. 9° As we further shape
the doctrine of deterrence in the face of catastrophic terrorist nuclear
attack, there is value in importing concepts in tort, such as
negligence and strict liability, agency and respondeat superior, into
the equation.
We can infer attribution of an attack to a particular suspect
terrorist sponsor, but to do so we need a basis for policy-an
intellectual model that would support the inference. Tort theory
might be useful in filling this void since it is based on deterring
conduct by shifting or imposing liability for harm. It may provide a
guide for attribution during circumstances that are ambiguous,
89. In 1996, for example, Congress added a provision to the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act that created a new exception to immunity in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") for "state sponsors of terrorism."
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7) (West 2006).
Designation of state sponsors of terrorism is made annually by the Department of
State. After removing state immunity, Congress created the "Flatow Amendment,"
a statutory cause of action for suits against agents of state sponsors of terrorism,
which is codified as a note to § 1605 of the FSIA. Although the FSIA permits

punitive awards against state agents and instrumentalities, it generally precludes
awards against the state. This historical state privilege, however, is under assault.
See, e.g., Stefan Kirchner, Third Party Liability for Hezbollah Attacks against
Israel, 7 GERMAN LAW J. 777, 780-84 (2006) (describing Lebanese, Iranian and
Syrian state responsibility for Hezbollah attacks against Israel); Vincent-Joel
Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing to

Prevent TransborderAttacks?, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 615, 667 (2005) (arguing
that the strict liability model of state responsibility promotes "international peace
and security").
90. See Brzezinski, supra note 47 (asserting that "nuclear forensics would
make it difficult to disguise the point of origin").
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complicating an adversary's calculation and thereby strengthening
deterrence.
Generally, negligence is focused on conduct that is "unreasonably
risky."91 Much of tort law is devoted to deciding what constitutes
unreasonable risk.9 2 A negligence case requires that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty of care, such as not engaging in
unreasonably risky conduct.93 In international relations, there are
several sources of international law to protect countries from the
specter of nuclear terrorism, and that law imposes a duty of care on
all states. Foremost, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter requires
member states to refrain from "the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence" of another member
state.94 More specifically, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540
contains enumerated and binding requirements for states to "refrain
from providing any form of support to non-State actors" to develop,
acquire, or use nuclear weapons. 95 States are also compelled to adopt
"appropriate effective" national laws which prohibit non-state actors
from engaging in nuclear weapons development or employment.96
Negligence generally requires breach of an existing duty through
unreasonably risky conduct. 97 In the case of deterrence, negligence
relates to conduct of the regime and the state and not the
government's state of mind. "[C]onduct is everything." 98 The
conduct must have in fact caused harm to the plaintiff; in deterrence,
the state sponsor or the terrorist group must have successfully
executed a catastrophic attack. Moreover, the conduct of the terrorist
organization, or the state sponsor, must have been a proximate cause

91. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114 (2000).

92.

Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 291 (1965) (providing that an

act is unreasonably risky if a reasonable person would have identified the risk of
harm, and the risk was "of such magnitude as to outweigh" the act's utility).
93. DOBBS, supra note 91, § 114.

94. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
95. S.C. Res. 1540, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
96. Id. 2.
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (2005) (providing that, under the
negligence doctrine, actors have a duty to use reasonable care when their actions
could create a risk of physical injury).
98. DOBBS, supra note 91, § 116.
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of the harm, meaning that the conduct has a significant relationship
to the harm. 99
In terms of state sponsorship of catastrophic terrorism, the
proximate cause analysis could be the most difficult to work
through-requiring a line to be drawn between harm that is a
foreseeable result of terrorist sponsorship and harm that is fortuitous
or the cause of the harm is trivial. In cases of trivial harm, for
example, the harm is more significantly related to other causes. 0 0
Suppose intelligence suggests State A has supplied a terrorist group
with weapons and equipment to steal a nuclear weapon from State B;
in response, State B dramatically increases the security of its nuclear
weapons stockpiles by moving some weapons to a more secure
location. In transit, a weapon is accidentally detonated in State B.
Although State A's conduct was a cause in fact of the nuclear
detonation suffered by State B, State A's conduct was not a
proximate cause of the devastation.
Conventional negligence is rooted in economic analysis' 0' and
involves breach of some level of reasonable standard of care to avoid
expected loss or harm. 02 Perhaps most obviously, nuclear deterrence
could resort to a negligence-based framework in which attribution of
a nuclear terrorist attack rests on those nations that have been
demonstrably negligent in securing nuclear material. The incentive,
of course, is to compel states to secure their material, but what do

99. See id. § 115; see, e.g., Debra M. Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a
New Front: Dismantling the InternationalHoldings of Terrorist Groups Through
FederalStatutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 679, 718-

721 (2005) (citing Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv & Dev. Corp, 274 F. Supp. 2d 86
(D.D.C. 2003), where victims of the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks and their
families filed tort claims against parties, including charitable organizations, banks
and corporations, that provided direct or indirect financial support to al Qaeda).
The District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, noting
that liability could be found under the aiding and abetting theory. Id.
100. DOBBS, supra note 91, § 115.
101. Cf WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85-87 (1987) (presenting an economic analysis of
negligence, where the burden or cost taken to prevent or avoid accidents should not
be less than the cost of expected damages).
102. Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 8

AM. L. & ECON. REv. 33, 50 (2006) (quoting Richard Posner's theory that actors
will breach a duty of care to another person if "'the cost of accidents is less than
the cost of prevention").
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you do if the negligent state is a country that is not an adversary,
such as Russia or Pakistan?
Unlike negligence, strict liability imposes liability regardless of
10 3
culpability; it often is viewed as the polar opposite of negligence.
Strict liability, which is synonymous with absolute liability, rests on
a "but-for" causal model. 104 Under strict liability, an injurer is liable
"under all circumstances."'0 5
American courts generally are sympathetic to imposing liability
without fault on landowners who put their land to unusual, nonmutual, or "abnormal" activities and, as a result, cause harm to
adjacent property.10 6 Developing nuclear material for terrorists
supports the analogy of unusual or "abnormal" activities at the
international level. Moreover, economists use strict liability as a rule
under which persons pay for harm that they cause, which is defined
10 7
as harm that would not have occurred but for their conduct.
The "but for" causality standard is a useful device to attach
responsibility to a state that, although at some fault, perhaps did not
intend the full consequences of their activities. This is especially
critical in countries such as Pakistan, in which one arm of the
government may not endorse or understand activities conducted by
another branch of the government.
Generally, a strict liability regime in civil law is most efficient in
preventing harm that can be avoided by one person. 10 8 The person
103. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
152 (1973) (explaining that under common law negligence, defendants can only be
held liable if they intended to cause the harm or "failed to take reasonable steps to
avoid inflicting the harm," whereas strict liability imposes liability regardless of
defendants' intent or negligence).

104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 cmt. b (2005) (stating that the
"but for" test of liability holds an actor liable if "in the absence of the act, the
outcome would not have occurred").
105. John Prather Brown, Toward An Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL

323, 328 (1973).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 20 (2005) (providing that actors

STUD.

who perform "abnormally dangerous activity" can be held strictly liable for harm
that the activity causes).
107. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 8 (1987)
(noting that under economic theory, if the injuring parties' costs are equal to the
costs of the harm caused, the injurers will have incentive to minimize accidents
and "exercise the optimal, moderate level of care").
108. See Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-
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who can avoid the harm bears the full expected costs; faced with
strict liability, he or she will exercise optimal care to avoid them.
Application of strict liability against states that spread nuclear
materials to terrorists appears to be particularly appealing in this
regard because the nuclear material itself-rather than financing,
technology or some other aspect of a terrorist operation-is the
critical ingredient in constructing a terrorist nuclear device. 0 9 In
addition to development of civil and administrative responses to
terrorism, some have suggested exploring "novel concepts of strict
liability" for use in imposing criminal liability on even unwitting
facilitators of terrorism.' 1 '
One doctrinal formulation of strict liability focuses on shifting
liability to injurers who can avoid causing injury at the lowest costthe cheapest cost avoider."' The concept refers to the party whose
avoidance would be most allocatively efficient. Applied to nuclear
doctrine, the cheapest cost avoider would focus on holding
responsible that state which constitutes the weakest link in the global
chain of nuclear materials. Since no nation wants to be the weakest
link, scrutiny as the "cheapest cost avoider" provides incentive for
those at the bottom to do better at preventing the leakage of nuclear
material into the black market and to terrorist groups.
Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1305 (1992) (explaining that strict liability creates
efficient incentives for an actor to avoid harm in cases where only one person
would cause the harm, because that person bears all potential costs of the harm and
can take steps to avoid an accident). In contrast, where many actors are liable for
harm, the individual actors do not bear the full costs and therefore have insufficient
incentive to prevent an accident. Id.
109. See, e.g., James Stemgold, Kerry, Bush Agree on Peril of Nuclear
Terrorism, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 2004, at A14 (presenting John Kerry's 2004
political slogan concerning the threat of nuclear terrorism-"No material. No
bomb. No nuclear terrorism."-as support that nuclear material is key to creating a
nuclear device).
110. Thomas D. Lehrman, Acting Office Director, State Dep't Office of
Strategic Planning and Outreach, Remarks to the NPT Conference at the American
University Washington College of Law (Feb. 9, 2006), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2006/Feb/27-135117.html (promoting the use of
strict liability to hold actors liable for facilitating the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, as means to combat terrorism).
11. Guido Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055, 1060 (1970) (noting that the "cheapest cost avoider" test
is not merely a cost-benefit analysis, but a consideration of which party is better
positioned to weigh "accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that
decision once it is made").
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The last clear chance doctrine is a fairly complicated exception to
the defense of contributory negligence.1 2 The seminal case involved
a plaintiff who tied his donkey in the road. As the donkey was eating
grass, the defendant ran into it. The plaintiff was not available to
save the animal when the defendant negligently struck it, but the
plaintiffs negligence did not bar recovery against the defendant
because the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid damage." 3
The doctrine says that even in cases in which the victim places
himself in danger from which he could not escape, the defendant is
still negligent if she could have avoided injury to him by exercising
ordinary care. 1 4 In these cases, a plaintiff victim's contributory
negligence would not bar a negligence claim against the plaintiff.115
Last clear chance was frequently at issue in railroad cases. If the
plaintiff was, even through fault of his own, "unconscious or
otherwise helpless on the tracks and the engineer could have
discovered his danger and helpless condition in time to avoid running
him down, the plaintiff's negligence in getting on the track in the
first place becomes irrelevant and he is allowed to recover against
16
the railroad."'
In application to strategic deterrence, the last clear chance doctrine
signals to potential adversaries that they would be held responsible
for an attack inflicted on the United States despite whatever case
they may make about prior American wrongs-real or imagined.
Consequently, the United States will not adjust its response, or factor
in contributory liability, if it is attacked with a nuclear weapon by a
group that articulates a set of complaints as the basis for its strike.

112. See Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative
Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV.

1103, 1130 (2002) (explaining that under the "last clear chance" doctrine, an act of
negligence supersedes previous contributory negligent acts).
113. Davies v. Mann, (1842) 10 M. & W. 547, 152 Eng. Rep. 588, 589 (Exch).
114. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating
Auth., 388 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (N.Y. 1979) (holding a bus driver liable for injuring
a child, although the child placed himself in danger by hanging from the side of the
moving bus, because the bus driver could have avoided the injury by using
ordinary care).
115. See, e.g., Robinson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1255, 1258-59 (D.C.
1990) (finding a driver liable under the "last clear chance" doctrine for injuring a
pedestrian who did not use crosswalk to cross a street).
116. DOBBS, supra note 91, § 200.

2007]

TORTS AND TERROR

389

Even in cases in which a state arguably acts to place itself in
danger (e.g. invasion of Iraq), the defendant still retains the last clear
chance of avoiding injury by exercising ordinary care. This places
the onus on the sponsor of a terrorist group to stop a catastrophic
attack or suffer a range of responses.

VI. CONCLUSION: ENHANCING DETERRENCE
Since the rise of the realist movement in American law, outside
disciplines have been used to shape the way we think about law.' 17
This gave rise to the "law and. . ." phenomenon, with law borrowing
insights from psychology, sociology, political science, and
eventually economics and critical race theory. There have been fewer
occasions to reverse the flow and apply the structure and logic of
legal thought to policy questions.
The law of torts offers a new theoretical model that can bring
greater clarity to the conundrum of nuclear terrorism. The model
provides intellectual honesty and rigor to a nuclear doctrine of
deterrence, helping us to refurbish a doctrine many regard as
languishing in a state of disrepair. The exercise also helps to inform
deterrence signaling to potential aggressors about how we might
subjectively evaluate circumstances of terrorist nuclear attack,
thereby introducing greater clarity-and a potentially lower
threshold-to situations that might invite a massive response. This
could be particularly useful for nuclear terrorist threats that arise
from areas of the world where different belief systems, such as the
blood feud, provide the basis for evaluating violence. Putting
potential adversaries on notice with alternative deterrent models
based in torts law sensitizes those adversaries to how we view the
gravity of their conduct, and the potentially severe responses that
conduct could provoke. Raising the prospect of a sufficiently severe
response to previously ambiguous situations strengthens deterrence.
In strengthening deterrence, tort-centered approaches avoid many
of the most controversial pitfalls of some other counterproliferation
strategies-particularly anticipatory self-defense, preemption, or
117. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 89-97
(1995) (providing background on the legal realism movement that swept through
North America during the first three decades of the twentieth century, and
describing the social sciences' impact in shaping modem perspectives of the law.)
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preventive war-which are viewed by many as weakening the norms
against armed aggression reflected in Article 2(4) the U.N. Charter.
"The problem that the invasion of Iraq has brought to the fore,"
wrote Professor Thomas Franck in early 2006,
is not primarily one of defining or reforming a right to
anticipatory, preemptive, or preventive self-defense in the era
of WMDs, daunting as such a project may be. The problem is
that, even if such a commonly accepted right could be
formulated, by treaty or by practice, it would be wholly
illegitimate so long as some nations insisted on the right to
interpret and apply the new rule unilaterally.' s
Borrowing concepts from the civil law of torts can strengthen
strategic nuclear doctrine in an era when strategic threats emanate
from non-state actors and the weakest of nations pose the gravest
risks to national security. The panoply of essential and expanding
nonproliferation and consequence management tools provide a
terrorism.
nuclear
against
protection
of
foundation
Counterproliferation is also being transformed, with a range of
programs under consideration, such as the small, low-yield nuclear
weapons for use against enemy WMD installations and underground
bunkers" 19 and the development of quick-reaction conventionally
armed ballistic missiles.12 0 Part of the transformation in
118. Thomas M. Franck, Centennial Essay, The Power of Legitimacy and the
Legitimacy of Power: InternationalLaw in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100
AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 102 (2006). It bears keeping in mind, however, that decades
before President George W. Bush contemplated a war in Iraq, the "death" of article
2(4) had already been pronounced. See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article
2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States 64 AM. J. INT'L
L. 809, 818-819, 835 (1970) ( "[t]he prohibition against the use of force in
relations between states has been eroded beyond recognition"). Professor Frank
attributed the demise of article 2(4) in part to increasing numbers of defensive wars
against "indirect and vicarious aggression." Id. at 819.
119.

Cf THOMAS MCINERNEY & PAUL VALLELY, ENDGAME: THE BLUEPRINT

FOR VICTORY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 143 (2004) (discussing the need for new
military equipment to strengthen the war on terror).
120. See Ann Scott Tyson, Pentagon Seeks to Fund New Force of ConventionalWarhead Missiles, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2006, at A12 (quoting Hans Kristensen,
director of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American
Scientists, describing the advantage of quick-reaction conventionally armed
ballistic missiles: "With estimated flight times of 12 to 24 minutes, the
conventionally armed missiles could be used quickly against a remote and fleeting
'terrorist stronghold' or against a nation threatening a neighbor with a missile
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counterproliferation should include new
departure to refresh the deterrence doctrine.

intellectual

points of

attack-targets that could take many hours, days, or weeks to reach with cruise
missiles, bombers or ground forces.").

